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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Raymond Brown appeals from his conviction and 
sentence in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.  He 
argues that the use of dual juries (one for him, and one for a 
co-defendant) violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.  
He also asks us to reconsider our rule placing the burden on 
defendants to object at sentencing, and he says we should 
instead require the sentencing court to solicit objections.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm.   
 
I. Background 
 
 Brown and seven others were charged in a 69-count 
Third Superseding Indictment with crimes related to multiple 
conspiracies to purchase, transport, and distribute cocaine.  
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The central feature of the case was a cocaine enterprise 
organized by Robert Tapia, a Virgin Islands law enforcement 
officer.     
 
Ultimately, only Brown and one other defendant, 
Walter Hill, proceeded to trial.  Although both Brown and 
Hill were connected to the enterprise, there was no allegation 
that the two conspired with one another.  Brown 
communicated with Tapia about potential cocaine purchases 
and helped deliver the cocaine to Tapia, while Hill assisted in 
the collection and subsequent transportation of the purchased 
cocaine.     
 
Before trial, the Court observed that, “[w]hile initially 
there was an overarching conspiracy, there is none now.  And 
nothing that ties the two defendants together.”  (Supp. App. at 
1.)  Therefore, “[o]ut of an abundance of caution, the Court 
… select[ed] two juries to hear th[e] matter.”  (Id.)  It 
explained the process of empaneling two separate juries and 
had counsel agree on the record to that procedure.  It then 
designated Brown’s jury “Panel A” and Hill’s jury “Panel B.”  
Panel A convicted Brown on Count Six, for using a 
communication to facilitate a drug crime, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 843(b) and (d)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  He was 
acquitted on nine other counts.1     
 
                                              
1 Panel B convicted Hill of conspiracy with intent to 
distribute cocaine, possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine, and use of a communication facility to commit a 
drug crime.   
 
4 
 
 At sentencing, the Court determined that Brown had an 
offense level of 28 and a criminal history category of I.  It 
then calculated the guideline range of imprisonment as 78 to 
97 months.  Because the minimum term of imprisonment 
under the guidelines exceeded the statutory maximum 
sentence, the Court turned to § 5G1.1(a) of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines.2  Pursuant to that section, and after 
consideration of the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553, the Court sentenced Brown to the statutory 
maximum term of 48 months.  Brown did not object to the 
sentence.  
 
II. Discussion3  
 
A. Dual Juries 
 
Brown challenges the District Court’s decision to 
empanel dual juries as violative of his Fifth Amendment right 
to due process and Sixth Amendment right to trial before an 
impartial jury.4  Because there was no contemporaneous 
                                              
2 Section 5G1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines states 
that “[w]here the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is 
less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the 
statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the 
guideline sentence.” 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
4 The Fifth Amendment protects a defendant from 
deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without due process 
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objection, we review the Court’s decision for plain error 
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), unless the 
issue was waived.5  Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 
135 (2009).  We thus begin by asking whether there was 
waiver, because “[t]he threshold question in deciding whether 
there is appellate authority to grant relief under Rule 52(b), is 
… whether the appellant who failed to object in the trial court 
to an error that violated his rights was aware of the 
relinquished or abandoned right.”  Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. 
Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2005).  Since waiver is a 
threshold question under Rule 52(b), id., we will address it 
even though the government did not argue the point in its 
Answering Brief.   
 
On the procedural facts here, one could contend that 
Brown did waive his right to complain about the empanelling 
of dual juries.  Not only did his counsel fail to object to 
                                                                                                     
of law[.]”  U.S. Const. amend. V.  The Sixth Amendment 
entitles a defendant to “a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury[.]”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.   
 
5 Brown argues that he should escape plain error 
review because his trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by not objecting to the use of dual juries.  But, 
except in extraordinary circumstances, “claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel … are not cognizable on direct appeal.”  
United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 464 (3d Cir. 2003).  To 
spare Brown “from having res judicata attach to the 
ineffective assistance claim,” we decline to address it here.  
Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Vanterpool, 767 F.3d 157, 164 (3d 
Cir. 2014). 
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proceeding in a single trial before two juries, but, after the 
District Court solicited objections, counsel explicitly agreed 
to it.6  And yet, “an explicit agreement or stipulation 
constitutes a waiver of rights [only] if the defendant was 
aware of the right.”  Id.  As with the waiver of rights, so too 
with the arguments associated with those rights – because the 
government did not demonstrate, nor does the record show, 
that Brown himself was aware of the rights implicated by the 
joinder of his and Hill’s cases and the use of dual juries, we 
cannot say that Brown knowingly and intelligently waived 
any arguments bearing on those rights.7  See Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (“[T]he proper standard 
to be applied in determining the question of waiver as a 
matter of federal constitutional law” requires the government 
“to prove ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
                                              
6 After explaining the dual jury process, the District 
Court specifically stated that it did not “believe it ha[d] any 
objection from counsel with the [dual jury] procedure as … 
just outlined.”  (Supp. App. 2.)  Brown’s counsel was asked 
to confirm that was the case, and he said, “Yes, Your Honor.”  
(Id.)   
 
7 We do not hold that a defendant must be personally 
aware of and knowingly waive every issue that may arise in a 
case, only those issues involving fundamental constitutional 
rights.  See McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 944 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (“[T]he Supreme Court has cautioned ‘that courts 
indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume 
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’” (quoting 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938))).   
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known right or privilege.’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458, 464 (1938))).   
 
When addressing a waiver of the right to a jury trial in 
the context of a guilty plea, we have required that the 
defendant be individually informed of and understand that 
right before he can knowingly waive it.  Taylor v. Horn, 504 
F.3d 416, 440 (3d Cir. 2007).  To that end, the trial court 
engages in a colloquy to ensure “the defendant fully 
understands the nature of the right and how it would likely 
apply in general in the circumstances[.]”  Id. (quoting Iowa v. 
Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 92 (2004)).  That practice is also used to 
ensure that a criminal defendant’s waiver of other key 
constitutional protections is knowing and intelligent.  See 
United States v. Stewart, 977 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(recognizing that a colloquy is required before waiving “the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a 
trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers” after 
the Supreme Court decision in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238 (1969)); see also United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 
135-36 (3d Cir. 2002) (requiring a colloquy when waiving 
right to counsel by proceeding pro se).  
 
We need not decide whether a colloquy with the 
defendant is essential, even if it is advisable, when a court 
proposes to proceed before dual juries rather than following 
the standard practice of trying a case before a single jury.  It 
is enough to say that there must be some indication on the 
record that the defendant was actually aware of his due 
process and jury rights and that he himself – not just his 
counsel – knowingly sanctioned a procedure that arguably 
impinges on those rights.  The government here did not assert 
waiver, and thus did not sustain its burden necessary for 
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waiver.  Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404.  There simply is nothing to 
suggest that Brown was personally aware of his right to an 
impartial jury and then, “with an understanding of the 
ramifications and consequences[,]” Peppers, 302 F.3d at 129, 
went ahead and waived any objection to being tried together 
with Hill before dual juries.  Therefore, the statement of 
Brown’s counsel agreeing that there was no objection to the 
joint trial before dual juries does not constitute a waiver of 
Brown’s ability to raise arguments now concerning joinder 
and the right to an impartial jury.  We thus review for plain 
error.  
 
On plain error review, we can only correct an error not 
raised at trial where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there 
is a legal error; (2) the legal error is clear or obvious; (3) the 
error affected the appellant’s substantial rights such that it 
affected the outcome of district court proceedings; and (4) the 
error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725, 736 (1993)).   
 
The use of dual juries seems to have very little 
precedent in this Circuit – we have found only one example 
of it, which was not challenged on appeal.  See United States 
v. Cruz, No. 98-5170, 1998 WL 34096109 (stating in 
Appellant’s Opening Brief, at *3-4, that the District Court had 
decided “to resolve the issue regarding the admissibility of 
the statements made by codefendants … by empaneling [sic] 
two juries; one for [Appellant] and one for the three 
remaining defendants”).  The practice has, however, occurred 
and been constitutionally challenged in several other courts of 
appeals.  Each circuit court that has addressed the use of dual 
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juries has upheld the practice unless a defendant can “show 
some specific, undue prejudice.”  Mack v. Peters, 80 F.3d 
230, 235 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Lambright v. Stewart, 191 
F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding use where there 
was no due process violation and neither defendant 
“convincingly pointed to some other specific trial right which 
was compromised”); United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 
F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir. 1987) (requiring defendant to carry 
“heavy burden of making a strong showing of prejudice”); 
United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(analyzing whether there was any specific prejudice resulting 
from dual juries); United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 
1366 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); United States v. Rowan, 518 
F.2d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 1975) (same).  A review of Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 and our precedent governing 
the use of joint trials supports the uniform holdings of our 
sister circuits, and we agree that the use of dual juries is not 
per se unconstitutional.  
 
Rule 14 provides relief to defendants from “prejudicial 
joinder.”  Under that rule, “[i]f the joinder of offenses or 
defendants in an indictment, an information, or a 
consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant or the 
government, the court may order separate trials of counts, 
sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that 
justice requires.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 14.  Permitting courts to 
“provide any other relief that justice requires” affords great 
latitude to trial courts to craft remedies that fit the 
circumstances of each case.  Id.  “Moreover, Rule 14 does not 
require severance even if prejudice is shown; rather, it leaves 
the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district 
court’s sound discretion.”  Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 
534, 538-39 (1993) (citation omitted).  As a result, we require 
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“[d]efendants seeking a severance [to] bear a heavy burden 
and … demonstrate not only that the court would abuse its 
discretion if it denied severance, but also that the denial of 
severance would lead to clear and substantial prejudice 
resulting in a manifestly unfair trial.”  United States v. Lore, 
430 F.3d 190, 205 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
We see no reason why the rule should be any different 
when the joint trial is before two juries rather than one.  In 
fact, depending on the circumstances, a joint trial before 
separate juries could be more protective of defendants’ rights 
than the use of a single jury.  See Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 
at 831 (concluding that the use of dual juries was “a way of 
minimizing any prejudice from jointly trying the 
defendants”).  Therefore, as required for severance generally, 
in order to successfully challenge the use of dual juries, a 
defendant “must demonstrate clear and substantial prejudice 
resulting in a manifestly unfair trial.”  United States v. Balter, 
91 F.3d 427, 433 (3d Cir. 1996), as amended (Aug. 16, 1996) 
(quoting United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1094 (3d Cir. 
1996)).   
 
Brown argues that empaneling two juries violated due 
process and his right to an impartial jury because the jury was 
“exposed to irrelevant evidence that by its very nature did not 
apply to him.”  (Opening Br. at 13.)  He provides one 
example of confusion, where, on cross-examination, a witness 
mixed-up the two defendants and the government had to 
correct the error on redirect.  But there is no dispute that the 
error was corrected.  And we have often declined to find 
prejudice “‘in a joint trial just because all evidence adduced is 
not germane to all counts against each defendant’ or some 
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evidence adduced is ‘more damaging to one defendant than 
others.’”  Balter, 91 F.3d at 433 (quoting United States v. 
Console, 13 F.3d 641, 655 (3d Cir. 1993)).  Without any 
indication that there was “clear and substantial prejudice 
resulting in a manifestly unfair trial[,]” Brown cannot show 
that the use of dual juries constituted error, let alone plain 
error.  Lore, 430 F.3d at 205 (quoting United States v. Urban, 
404 F.3d 754, 775 (3d Cir. 2005)).   
 
It is a “fundamental principle that the federal system 
prefers ‘joint trials of defendants who are indicted together []’ 
because joint trials ‘promote efficiency and serve the interests 
of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent 
verdicts.’”8  Urban, 404 F.3d at 775 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 537).  If dual juries can be 
empanelled without “a serious risk that [such] a joint trial 
would compromise a specific trial right of one of the 
defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable 
judgment about guilt or innocence,” the practice is not in 
itself unconstitutional.  Id.  That said, we do not mean by this 
ruling to encourage the practice.  The potential complications 
are not insignificant.  Nevertheless, Brown has not shown any 
obvious error affecting substantial rights or the fairness of the 
proceedings.  We will therefore affirm his conviction.   
 
                                              
8 Given the District Court’s comment that “nothing [] 
ties the two defendants together” (Supp. App. at 1), we are 
conscious of the concern that joinder here may have lacked 
the robust justification it ordinarily has.  But the record 
indicates that there actually was overlap in the factual 
background of Brown’s and Hill’s cases, and we cannot say 
that joinder was plainly erroneous.   
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B. Failure to Object at Sentencing 
 
Brown also challenges the Court’s failure to solicit 
objections before imposing sentence, arguing that we should 
overturn our recent en banc decision in United States v. 
Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2014).  In Flores-Mejia, 
“we h[e]ld that, in a criminal prosecution, unless a relevant 
objection has been made earlier, a party must object to a 
procedural error after the sentence is pronounced in order to 
preserve the error and avoid plain error review.”  759 F.3d at 
258.  Under Flores-Mejia, because Brown did not object to 
his sentence, an appeal of that sentence would be subject to 
plain error review.  Brown does not, however, appeal any 
aspect of his sentence.  Reconsidering Flores-Mejia would 
thus have no affect on his appeal – there is simply no alleged 
error to which we could apply a more generous standard of 
review.  We have, then, no occasion to reconsider our well-
reasoned decision in Flores-Mejia at this time, even if we 
were inclined or empowered to do so. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Brown’s 
conviction and sentence.  
